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This  paper  concerns  a  neglected  aspect  of  Lucas’s  work:  his  methodological  writings, 
published  and  unpublished.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  his  views  on  the  relationship 
between theory and ideology. I start by setting out Lucas’s non-standard conception of theory: 
to him, a theory and a model are the same thing. I also explore the different facets and 
implications of this conception. In the next two sections, I debate whether Lucas adheres to 
two methodological principles that I dub the ‘non-interference’ precept (the proposition that 
ideological viewpoints should not influence theory), and the ‘non-exploitation’ precept (that 
the models’ conclusions should not be transposed into policy recommendations, in so far as 
these conclusions are built into the models’ premises). The last part of the paper contains my 
assessment of Lucas’s ideas. First, I bring out the extent to which Lucas departs from the view 
held  by  most  specialized  methodologists.  Second,  I  wonder  whether  the  new  classical 
revolution  resulted  from  a  political  agenda.  Third  and  finally,  I  claim  that  the  tensions 
characterizing  Lucas’s  conception  of  theory  follow  from  his  having  one  foot  in  the  neo-
Walrasian and the other in the Marshallian-Friedmanian universe. 
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acknowledges his gratitude to Robert Lucas for having authorized him to quote from the Lucas Archives held at 
Duke University, as  well  as for his  comments on the paper. Kevin Hoover’s vivid comments on an earlier 
version were also stimulating.     1 
Introduction 
This  article  is  a  sequel  to  my  paper,  “Lucas  on  the  Lucasian  Transformation  of 
Macroeconomics:  An  Assessment”  (De  Vroey  2010),  in  which  I  retraced  the  intellectual 
journey that led Lucas to change the course of macroeconomics. In that article, I indirectly 
indicated the relationship between Lucas’s ideology and his economic theory. My aim in this 
paper is to delve more deeply into this issue. This is a topic that one might not expect Lucas 
himself to address, but in fact he does. Among the economists who changed the course of 
macroeconomics, Lucas is actually the one who has devoted the most attention to discussing 
the methodological dimension of their enterprise — to an extent which led Prescott to hail 
him as “the master of methodology, as well as defining problems” (Prescott’s interview with 
Snowdon and Vane 2005, p. 351). My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Lucas’s standpoint 
on  the  relationship  between  ideology  and  theory,  and  to  locate  it  within  his  wider 
methodological vision.  
Such a project faces several difficulties. One of these is that there is no single article in which 
Lucas explores his methodological standpoint in a systematic way. It has to be reconstructed 
from  the  many  scattered  remarks  on  the  subject  to  be  found  in  both  his  published  and 
unpublished works. Lucas’s unpublished works have been collected in the Lucas Archives at 
Duke University’s Special Archives division (Lucas, various). They are mainly drafts and 
correspondence,  and  they  are  invaluable  for  my  inquiry  for  several  reasons:  they  may 
complement  the  published  works,  they  may  shed  light  on  the  genesis  of  Lucas’s  mature 
vision, and they may reveal Lucas’s deep-seated views, what he really believed but decided 
not to reveal in public. On the other hand, unpublished pieces found in archives also raise 
difficulties:  they  must  be  interpreted  cautiously  because  the  reason  they  have  remained 
unpublished may well be that the author has abandoned the views expressed in them. Be that 
as it may, the greater the congruency of drafts with published pieces, the higher the likelihood 
that they are more than tentative ideas committed to paper. The test of such congruency is that 
any idea expressed in a draft should have a corresponding passage in a published piece. This 
is  often  true  for  Lucas,  a  typical  situation  being  one  in  which  ideas  that  are  expressed 
succinctly, if not inadvertently, in a published article are based upon a fuller treatment in 
earlier notes which remained unpublished.
1 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  its  first  part,  I  discuss  Lucas’s  view  of  ‘good’ 
macroeconomic theory and ideology. I show that his definition of theory is narrower than the 
                                                 
1 The Lucas archives also contain draft versions of published papers. A comparison of the final draft with the 
published version sometimes reveals that Lucas decided to delete whole paragraphs of the draft paper. These are 
passages which Lucas wrote but eventually chose not to publish, in my opinion often for diplomatic reasons. 
Nonetheless, the commentator will find such passages especially enlightening and may well wish to quote them. 
This is fair game, I think, once an author has agreed to open his archives. However the reader should be warned 
about the particular status of these passages. In the present article, the situation occurs only once, apropos of 
Lucas’s review article of Tobin’s Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity book.   2 
common understanding, and continue with a few other clarifications of his vision. In Part 2, I 
discuss  Lucas’s  position  with  respect  to  what  I  call  the  ‘non-interference’  precept,  the 
proposition that ideology should not interfere into theory. In the third part, I do the same with 
the ‘non-exploitation’ precept, the proposition that a model’s policy conclusions should not be 
translated into policy recommendations to public authorities whenever these conclusions are 
built into the model’s premises. Part 4 is my assessment of Lucas’s standpoint. First, I bring 
out the extent to which Lucas departs from the view held by most specialized methodologists. 
Second, I wonder whether the new classical revolution resulted from a political agenda. Third, 
I claim that Lucas’s methodological standpoint shows signs of  tension, which I explain by 
arguing that Lucas has one foot in the Walrasian and the other in the Marshallian universe. 
That is, while proclaiming to be a neo-Walrasian economist, Lucas has no qualms working 
along Friedmanian methodological principles. To me, this is troublesome since I view these 
two approaches as incompatible. 
 
1. Lucas’s conception of macroeconomic theory and ideology 
2 
Economic theory 
Lucas  holds  a  narrow  view  of  what  macroeconomic  theory  ought  to  be.  This  can  be 
summarized as: 
(a) There should be no split between the principles underpinning microeconomics and those 
underpinning macroeconomics (Lucas 1987, p. 107-108). That is, macroeconomics without 
microfoundations is unacceptable. 
(b) Macroeconomics is part of general equilibrium analysis. Its concern is the working of an 
entire economy, and it ought to account for the interactions between the component parts of 
the economy. 
(c) A macroeconomic theory and a mathematical model are one and the same thing. This 
conception, which can be traced back to Walras, runs counter to another, more widespread, 
understanding of the relationship between theory and model, according to which a theory and 
a model are two distinct entities: a theory is a set of propositions about reality while a model, 
be it mathematical or in prose, is an attempt at rigorously setting out the implications of some 
part of the theory.
 3  
                                                 
2 Friedman wrote his famous “Methodology of Positive Economics” essay (Friedman 1953) almost from scratch, 
with little reference to the methodology literature of the time. This is also true of Lucas’s writing. For a wider 
analysis of Lucas’s epistemology, see Vercelli (1991). 
3 Thus, in the traditional view, the model is subservient to the theory.
 The following quote from Leijonhufvud is 
a fine depiction of this viewpoint: “I propose to conceive of economic ‘theories’ as a set of beliefs about the 
economy and how it functions. They refer to the ‘real world’ .… ‘Models’ are formal but partial representations 
of theories. A model never encompasses the entire theory to which it refers” (1997, p. 193).    3 
(d) A theory is concerned with imaginary constructions; it is avowedly non-realistic. 
On  this  general  view  of  the  nature  of  economic  theory  then  a  ‘theory’  is  not  a 
collection of assertions about the behavior of the actual economy but rather an explicit 
set of instructions for building a parallel or analogue system – a mechanical, imitation 
economy. A ‘good’ model, from this point of view, will not be exactly more ‘real’ than a 
poor one, but will provide better imitations (Lucas [1980a] 1981a, pp. 271-272). 
Progress  in  economic  thinking  means  getting  better  and  better  abstract,  analogue 
economic  models,  not  better  verbal  observations  about  the  world  (Lucas  [1980a] 
1981a, p. 276). 
Central assumptions of macroeconomic models, such as rational expectations, ought to be 
viewed  as  modeling  devices,  technical  model-building  principles  rather  than  propositions 
about reality.
4  
(e) Macroeconomic models are of no interest if they fail to reach policy conclusions. “The 
central question that macroeconomists need to resolve: Which necessarily abstract models can 
help us to answer which practical questions of economic policy?” (Lucas (various) Box 23, 
Tobin folder). According to Lucas, old style macroeconometric models were praiseworthy 
because they resulted in policy conclusions, a virtue that, he thinks, has been lost in new 
Keynesian models, such as efficiency wages models.
5 
(f) Theory ought to be tested against facts. Its aim is to construct “a fully articulate artificial 
economy which behaves through time so as to imitate closely the time series behavior of 
actual economies” (Lucas [1977] 1981a, p. 219). 
Our task as I see it is to write a FORTRAN program that will accept specific economic 
policy rules as ‘inputs’ and will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing the operating 
characteristics of times series we care about, which are predicted to result from these 
policies (Lucas [1980a] 1981a, p. 288). 
The  empirical  testing  of  the  theory  is  critical  precisely  because  we  know  that  the 
axioms are abstractions, necessarily ‘false’, so we need to know whether and under 
what range of circumstances these abstractions are adequate (Lucas 1986, p. S 408) 
                                                 
4 “One can ask, for example, whether expectations are rational in the Klein-Goldberger model of the United 
States economy; one cannot ask whether people in the United States have rational expectations” (Lucas (various) 
Box 23, Barro Folder). 
5 “Keynesian models in the 1960s, and this is what excited people like Sargent and me, were operational in the 
sense that you could quantify the effects of various policy changes by simulating these models. You could find 
out what would happen if you balanced the budget every year, or if you increased the money supply, or changed 
fiscal policy. That was what was exciting. They were operational, quantitative models that addressed important 
policy questions. Now in that sense new Keynesian models are not quantitative, are not fitted to data, there are 
no realistic dynamics in them. They are not used to address any policy conclusions. What are the principal policy 
conclusions of ‘new Keynesian economics’? Ask Greg Mankiw that question the next time you interview him. 
(laughter) I don’t even ask that they prove interesting policy conclusions, just that they attempt some” (Lucas’s 
interview with Snowdon and Vane 1998, p. 131).   4 
A theory/model ought to be assessed by its ability to make correct predictions. The better its 
ability to reproduce past events, the more trustworthy the model is for assessing new policy 
measures.
6 
While Lucas never wrote a systematic exposition of his methodological standpoint — his 
“Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory” ([1980a] 1981a) comes closest to such an 
enterprise — it should be noted that about half the essays in his book, Studies in Business 
Cycle Theory, are of a methodological nature. The above account is drawn mainly from them. 
Note also that, with a few exceptions (e.g. Lucas and Rapping ([1969] 1981a)), Lucas’s main 
contributions  were  qualitative  or  critical.  Item  (f),  confrontation  of  theory  with  facts  (as 
encapsulated in the FORTRAN quotation given above), was at the time more a program for 
the future than an assessment of what had been achieved. Its implementation came a few 
years later in Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) distinctive contribution. Here is how Woodford 
describes it:  
The  real  business  cycle  literature  offered  a  new  methodology,  both  for  theoretical 
analysis  and  for  empirical  testing.  …  It  showed  how  [Lucas-type] models  could  be 
made quantitative, emphasizing the assignment of realistic numerical parameter values 
and the computation of numerical solutions to the equations of the model, rather than 
being  content  with  merely  qualitative  conclusions  derived  from  more  general 
assumptions. The “equilibrium business cycle models” of Lucas had really only been 
parables;  they  could  not  be  regarded  as  literal  descriptions  of  an  economy,  even 
allowing for the sort of idealization that all models of reality have. … Real business 
cycle models are instead quantitative models, that are intended to be taken seriously as 
literal  depictions  of  the  economy,  even  if  many  details  are  abstracted  from.  The 
literature emphasizes the numerical predictions of the models, when parameter values 
are assigned on the basis of measurement of the relevant aspects of an actual economy 
(Woodford 1999, pp. 25-26). 
Lucas has fully endorsed this development which he considers as a prime example of the way 
in which macroeconomics should evolve.  
How well did [the Kydland-Prescott model] do? People are still arguing about this, but 
what is interesting is not so much the outcome of this argument, which is certainly still 
in doubt, as the language in which it is being conducted. When people criticize real 
business cycle models they criticize their assumptions about demography, preferences, 
technology, and market structure, in terms that are recognizable to any economist. The 
private jargon that macroeconomists developed during the period where it was cut off 
                                                 
6 “Would you agree that the appropriate criterion for establishing the fruitfulness of a theory is the degree of 
empirical corroboration attained by its predictions? Something like that. Yes” (Lucas’s interview with Snowdon 
and Vane 1998, p. 131).   5 
from mainstream economic theory — multipliers and gaps and Phillips curves and so on 
— has largely passed out of use. Macroeconomists today are expected to be able to 
discuss their ideas in the language of Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie. This is progress 
(Lucas 2007, p. 7-8).
7  
Ideology 
Lucas readily admits that, like all other citizens, economists hold ideological views. Here, the 
term ‘ideology’ does not carry any pejorative meaning, or refer to arguments imbued with bad 
faith or based on the defense of particular interests. Rather, it designates a vision of an ideal 
organization of society along several dimensions, one of which is the economic one (which is 
the only that will be considered in this article). The following two quotes, the first drawn from 
an interview with The Region, the second from a draft of his review of Tobin’s Yrjö Jahnson 
lectures (Tobin 1982), summarize Lucas’s standpoint: 
In economic policy, the frontier never changes. The issue is always mercantilism and 
government intervention vs. laissez faire and free market (The Region 1993, p. 3).  
There  are,  it  seems  to  me,  two  schools  of  macroeconomic  (and  perhaps  all)  social 
policies: one which keeps the power of government to injure in the front of its mind, 
and stresses policies which take the form of institutional constraints on government 
action, and another which focuses on the power of government to improve welfare, and 
seeks methods by which this power may be exercised more effectively (Lucas various, 
Box 23, Tobin folder).  
The split is between those who want to give competition its full rein, the defenders of the self-
regulating characteristics of markets (or ‘free marketers’) and those, the Keynesians, who 
think that the market economy, although the best economic system, can buttress failures, in 
particular an insufficiency in aggregate demand, which it is the state’s role to remedy. Lucas 
makes no secret of his preference for the free market viewpoint.
8  
The narrowness of Lucas’s conception of a theory 
The  hallmark  of  Lucas’  methodological  standpoint  is  his  narrow  conception  of  a  theory, 
which treats at theory and a mathematical model as identical. To him, everything else is meta-
                                                 
7 The quotation comes from an unpublished note written for the 1993 CORE Conference on general equilibrium 
held in Louvain-la-Neuve. The note was later inserted in an editorial written for a special issue of Economic 
Theory  in honor of  Edward Prescott. In the comments added to  the initial note,  Lucas  lifts  the reservation 
expressed at the beginning of the passage, saying “In 1993, I was still reluctant to acknowledge the substantive 
success of real business cycles models. Ten years later, this was no longer the case” (Lucas 2007, p.9).  
8 However, this does not make him a libertarian as the following extract from his correspondence makes clear: 
“When I walk  through Lincoln Park, I’m glad  that some ancient  Chicago government did not say: ‘It  is  a 
difficult problem for thousands of individuals to coordinate on providing themselves with parks, but there is no 
reason to believe governments have any particular aptitude for solving such problems. Let’s leave it to the free 
market’. So far as I know, governments are the only means by which the parks problems has been solved for 
large cities” (Letter to K. Matsuyama, March 29, 1995, Lucas (various) Box 15, Correspondence 1995 folder).   6 
theoretical. This is definitely a minority viewpoint. The counterpart of this narrowness is an 
extended conception of ideology. To Lucas, any discussion that fails to take the form of a 
mathematical model belongs to the sphere of ideology. As a result, he is led to define as 
ideological,  studies  that  are  usually  viewed  as  theory.  This  is  the  case  for  the  work  of 
economists such as Coase and Hayek. In spite of his sympathy with these authors, Lucas finds 
that they are engaged in ideological rather than theoretical activities. Their attitude, he writes, 
is 
Not so much a defense of free markets as it is an unwillingness to discuss the issue. … 
What  I  want  from  economics  is  a  set  of  principles  I  can  use  to  evaluate  proposed 
government interventions, case by case, on their individual merits. I agree that explicit 
modeling can give a spurious sense of omniscience that one has to guard against, … But 
if we give up explicit modeling, what we have got left except ideology? I don’t think 
either Hayek or Coase have faced up to this question. (letter to K. Matsuyama, March 
29, 1995, Lucas (various) Box 15, folder 1995, my emphasis).
9 
A further testimony to Lucas’s touchiness about the boundary between theory and ideology 
can be found in an exchange of letters with Modigliani. Invited to participate in a study of 
disagreement among economists by submitting a list of the five living economic theorists he 
appreciated the most, Lucas reacted by asking Modigliani to clarify the following point: “Do 
you  mean  ‘theory’  in  the  recent  sense  of  specialist  in  mathematical  economics,  or  just 
someone who uses economic reasoning rigorously in their work? In the first sense, Arrow is 
in  and  Friedman  is  out;  in  the  second,  I  would  include  both”  (Lucas,  various,  Box  25, 
Correspondence 1993 folder). I surmise that Lucas has a strong preference for the ‘recent 
sense’ to the effect that, for all his admiration for Friedman, he would exclude him from the 
circle of real theorists! 
Model economies as analogous systems 
Lucas’s ‘Tobin and Monetarism’ article is a stern criticism of Tobin’s Jahnson lectures (Tobin 
1982). In it, Lucas comments that:  
It does not seem to me a critical or an economic insight to observe that that one can 
detect differences between the world described in this paper [“Expectations and the 
Neutrality of Money”] and the United States, or that it utilizes ‘questionable ad hoc 
assumptions’, or that it leaves facts unexplained. … Insofar as theoretical models of this 
type have an influence that is worth trying to counteract (as Tobin wishes to do), it must 
be because people perceive useful analogies between the patently artificial world of the 
                                                 
9  As  far  as  Coase’s  theory  is  concerned,  Lucas’s  claim  is  supported  by  a  recent  article  by  Steve  Medema 
surveying the different ways in which the Coase theorem is represented in textbooks. It shows that this so-called 
theorem  is  interpreted  in  diametrically  opposite  ways  according  to  the  ideological  views  of  the  textbooks’ 
authors (Medema 2010).   7 
model and the world we live in, and not because they are unable to distinguish between 
these  two  different  worlds.  If  so,  the  successful  criticism  must  go  beyond  an 
enumeration of the ways in which the model and reality differ to offer some perception 
of the nature of the analogies that are being drawn and some argument to the effect that 
these analogies are misleading (Lucas, 1981b, pp. 562-3). 
In this passage, Lucas suggests that the usefulness of a model depends on whether it is a good 
analogy of the reality it is supposed to illuminate. The reader may ask what Lucas had in mind 
when he talked about an analogy, but no clue is provided in the published article. However, 
when searching Lucas’s archives, I found a series of drafts — some handwritten, some typed 
— in which he expanded at length on the notion of an analogy, on the role of models, and on 
the relationship between modeling and economic policy.
10 The following discussion is based 
on one such fragment. 
Lucas’s argumentation starts from two premises, both of which may come as a surprise. The 
first is that a model is an observable reality: 
We speak of modeling phenomena or models of phenomena, suggesting that observed 
phenomena are one kind of thing and models of them another thing, but I want to define 
a model to be itself a phenomenon: something the behavior of which can be observed. 
Then what is the relationship between a set of phenomena and the second set that we 
call a model of the first set? I will call this relationship analogy (Lucas, various, Box 
17). 
This still does not clarify what Lucas meant by the term ‘analogy’. An answer is provided 
later  in  the  same  draft,  Lucas  writing  that  he  takes  an  analogy  to  “mean  a  symmetric 
relationship between two things”. These things may either be a thing in the usual sense and a 
theory, which to Lucas is just another thing, or two procedures for generating observations. In 
another set of notes, Lucas adds that “we must make liberal use of analogies: judgments that 
one situation is similar enough to another to call for the same reaction”. 
The second premise follows from a bold comparison between economics and anthropology:  
Economic theory, like anthropology, ‘works’ by studying societies which are in some 
relevant sense simpler or more primitive than our own, in the hope either that relations 
that are important but hidden in our society will be laid bare in simpler ones, or that 
concrete evidence can be discovered for possibilities which are open to us which are 
                                                 
10 My guess is that these drafts were written at the end of the 1970s, a period in which Lucas gave many seminars 
on rational expectations and business cycle theory. Several of the insights in them have found their way into 
published material — for example, I counted seven occurrences of the term ‘analogy’ in Lucas’s ‘Methods and 
Problems’  article.  Unfortunately  the  drafts  are  collected  in  a  disordered  way  in  the  archives:  a  series  of 
fragments, often four or five pages long, all related to the same themes, but without any indication as to how they 
might be combined. To the best of my knowledge they never appeared in a finalized form in a published piece. 
In view of their interest and the lack of easy access, I shall quote from them extensively.    8 
without  precedent  in  our  own  history.  Unlike  anthropologists,  however,  economists 
simply invent the primitive societies we study, a practice which frees us from limiting 
ourselves to societies which can be physically visited as sparing us the discomforts of 
long stays among savages. This method of society-invention is the source of the utopian 
character of economics; and of the mix of distrust and envy with which we are viewed 
by our fellow social scientists. The point of studying wholly fictional, rather than actual 
societies, is that it is relatively inexpensive to subject them to external forces of various 
types and observe the way they react. If, subjected to forces similar to those acting on 
actual societies, the artificial society reacts in a similar way, we gain confidence that 
there are useable connections between the invented society and the one we really care 
about (Lucas, various, Box 23, Lucas’s emphasis). 
Possibly, anthropologists will fail to recognize themselves in Lucas’s account but, leaving this 
aside,  the  comparison  succeeds  in  bringing  out  Lucas’s  message:  models  are  fictional 
economies  from  the  manipulation  of  which  we  can  learn  about  the  functioning  of  real 
economies.  Lucas’s  reason  for  resorting  to  use  of  analogies  follows  from  his  view  that 
macroeconomics  should  be  used  to  assess  the  impact  of  policy  measures.  Normally,  the 
impact of such policies cannot be assessed experimentally.
11 So second-best ways need to be 
found. One of these is to look for analogous cases — has there been another, not too different, 
country where the policy under consideration has been tried? If yes, this experience may 
constitute a valuable reference. But then, Lucas’s argument goes on, real-world analogies are 
scarce. Again, a way out exists. The reference for such comparisons does not need to be a 
real-world experience; a model economy can do the job. Actually, it can do it better, the 
advantage of the model economy over the real-world analogy being that it can be controlled to 
improve on the similarities it offers. This is Lucas’s second justification for model building. 
I  like  to  think  of  theories  —  economic  and  psychological,  both  —  as  simulatable 
systems, analogues to the actual system we are trying to study. From this point of view, 
the Wharton model, say, bears the same kind of logical relationship to the United States 
economy as France, say, does: it is just a different economy, or system, but one that is 
similar enough to the U.S. economy that we might hope to learn about the properties of 
one through the study of the other. If our objective is to learn what the consequences of 
introducing a value added tax in the U.S. might be, we might study its consequences in 
France or simulate the Wharton system under such a tax or, better still, do both (Lucas, 
various, Box 17, Lucas’s emphasis). 
To sum up, to Lucas, models are fictive analogue systems permitting us to carry out quasi-
experiments to compare different economic policy alternatives. The more robust the model (as 
                                                 
11 According  to Lucas (see e.g. 1981b, p. 559),  the  stagflation episode of the 1970s was a near real-world 
experiment and hence an exception to the above remark.    9 
judged by testing its reality-mimicking ability on other matters than the policy to be assessed), 
the more trustworthy any assessment resting on it.  
I started my presentation of Lucas’s view of a theory by arguing that, to him, a theoretical 
proposition is a statement about a fictive economy rather than an actual economy. As a result, 
he claims, the right question to ask about such propositions is not whether they are true or 
false (because the answer is always ‘false’).
12 The proper question to ask is: “All we can say 
about an analogy is that it is good or bad, useful or useless, and such subjective terms only 
raise further questions: Good for what? Useful for what purpose”? (Lucas, various, Box 23, 
Barro folder). 
Lucas’s skepticism about expertise 
The  sequel  to  the  fragment  quoted  above  about  economics  and  anthropology  is  also 
interesting. It introduces two additional themes. The first, which again can be traced back to 
Walras, is that economic theory is utopian in nature.
13 The second is that economists agree too 
easily to act as experts, a role which society invites them to play, but about which they should 
be wary:  
This  utopian  character  of  economic  theory  is  the  only  reason  anyone  cares  about 
economics; it is also the source of the deep envy and mistrust with which we are viewed 
by  our  fellow  social  scientists.  In  an  age  in  which  utopian  thinking  is  for  entirely 
understandable reasons, unfashionable, most economists take pain to disguise what it is 
that we actually do. We are accepted as hardheaded, practical men-of-affairs, we enjoy 
the influence (or at least the appearance of influence) to which this image affords us 
access, and not a few of our number are at least as good as our legal colleagues in 
exercising  this  influence.  In  this  exercise,  it  proves  expedient  to  attempt  to  fit  the 
popular image of a scientist as one who knows ‘the facts’, whose views are dictated by 
the ‘evidence’. In this attempt, it is invaluable to be able to appear as a representative of 
a professional consensus, as one whose opinions may receive the empirical confirmation 
by a journalist with the resources to check the view of six others (five to agree, and one 
to prove the rule) (Lucas, various, Box 23, Barro folder). 
                                                 
12 “Do we value this theory (if one can discuss valuing the theory of value!) because we agree that it implies a set 
of verbal propositions about observations that can be refuted by keeping our eyes open for black swans [because 
seeing a black swan would indicate that the proposition that all swans are white is refuted (MDV)]? If so, what 
are these sentences that express — more accurately than the theorems or formulas themselves — what this 
theory really means, really implies? Shall we test the theory by checking sentences like: “in all economies, 
production possibility sets have nonempty interiors?” or “People tend to act in their own self-interest”? against 
what we see, the way we are supposed to check swan colors? Shall we dismiss Arrow and Debreu’s theory as 
vacuous,  and  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  application  of  it  as  wrong?  (Yes,  I  think,  except  for  ‘dismiss’).  An 
alternative  point  of  view  toward  things  and  theory  is  this:  we  observe  things  and  events,  and  we  perceive 
analogies among them” (Lucas, various, Box 23). 
13 “Pareto believes that the aim of science is to come closer to reality through successive approximations. I, for 
one, believe that the eventual aim of science is to bring reality close to a certain ideal. This is why I formulate 
this ideal” (Walras 2000, p. 567, my translation).   10 
Lucas’s questioning of the role of expert has not been limited to his unpublished writings. He 
broached the subject in his article “Rules, Discretion and the Role of Economic Advisor” 
(Lucas [1980b] 1981a). To him, that role is in large part a by-product of the US events that 
led to the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics. It all began, he claims, with the Employment 
Act of 1946. This Act, which embodied the lessons drawn from the Great Depression (that 
high  unemployment  was  costly,  and  that  government  policy  had  the  ability  to  affect 
unemployment), exerted a strong effect on the practice of monetary economics in the postwar 
period: 
Renamed macroeconomics, this subdiscipline [monetary economics] defined itself to be 
that body of expertise the existence of which was presupposed in the Employment Act, 
and  the  practitioners  devoted  themselves  to  the  development  and  refinement  of 
forecasting and policy evaluation methods which promised to be of use in the annual 
diagnosis-prescription exercise called for by the act (Lucas [1980b] 1981a, p. 250). 
According to Lucas, the vision underlying the Employment Act (and supported by Keynesian 
theory) was that the government had the ability to manipulate the economy in a costless way 
for the well-being of all. But taking this line had a flip side: it led to any in-depth reflection 
about the institutional reforms necessary to avoid further great depressions being swept under 
the rug.  
Instead, within the existing institutional framework, the role of the economic expert as 
a day-to-day manager expanded rapidly, and the role of the academic macroeconomist 
became that of equipping these experts with ideas, principles, formulas which gave, or 
appeared  to  give,  operational  guidance  on  the  task  with  which  these  economic 
managers happened to be faced (Lucas 1980b] 1981a, p. 251). 
For his part, Lucas strongly objected to such solicitations from civil society because they were 
based on the premise that some manipulations of the economy could be successful, while he 
felt that the theoretical framework justifying such manipulations was deeply flawed.
14 To him, 
                                                 
14 This point is well-developed in an aside to Lucas’s “Understanding Business Cycles” article: “Accompanying 
the redirection of scientific interest occasioned by the Keynesian Revolution was a sharp change in the nature of 
the contribution to policy which economists hoped to offer and which the public has come largely to accept. The 
effort to ‘explain business cycles’ had been directed at identifying institutional sources of instability, with the 
hope  that,  once  understood,  these  sources  could  be  removed  or  their  influence  mitigated  by  appropriate 
institutional changes. The process envisaged was the painfully slow one of public discussion and legislative 
reform;  on  the  other  side,  there  was  the  hope  of  long-term  or  ‘permanent’  institutional  improvement.  The 
abandonment of the effort to explain business cycles accompanied a belief that policy could effect immediate, or 
very short-term, movement of the economy from an undesirable current state, however arrived at, to a better 
state. The belief that the latter objective is attainable, and the attempt to come closer to achieving it is the only 
legitimate task of research in aggregate economics, is so widespread that argument to the contrary is viewed as 
‘destructive’, a willful attempt to make life more difficult for one’s colleagues who are only trying to improve 
the lot of mankind. Yet the situation is symmetric. If the business cycle theorists were correct, the short-term 
manipulation on which much of aggregative economics is now focused only diverts attention from discussion of 
stabilization policies which might actually be effective; such postponement is, moreover, accompanied by the   11 
the  1970s  stagflation  episode  was  the  day  of  reckoning,  the  symptom  of  much  deeper 
problems, namely the end of the vision associated with the Employment Act and Keynesian 
macroeconomics.  
All in all, Lucas has kept faith with the principles he espoused in the “Rules, Discretion …” 
paper. Compared to other economists of his standing (i.e. Nobel-prize winners), his presence 
in the media and his ‘expert’ offerings of advice have been scarce.  
 
2. Lucas on the ‘non-interference’ precept 
There is a widespread view that ideology should not interfere with theory. I propose to call 
this the ‘non-intervention’ precept. At first sight, there is little doubt that Lucas fully adheres 
to this precept. His criticism of Coase and Hayek mentioned above seems to be that asserting 
the identity of theory and model is the only way to chase ideology away. However, signs of a 
different standpoint can be found in his draft writings and correspondence. In these, he seems 
to  admit  that  ideology  underpins  theoretical  development.  Take  the  following  passage 
belonging to the fragment on which I drew heavily above: 
A purely sociological consequence of the advent of rational expectations has been a 
turning of this rhetorical table: now Keynesians are on the defensive about their models 
(or lack of them). There is no doubt that this advantage will prove transient. Keynesians 
are  already  learning  to  ‘wing  it’  on  policy  questions,  without  use  of  the  IS-LM 
apparatus, or with any other apparatus to replace it (Lucas, various, Box 23, Barro 
folder). 
Here, Lucas’s point is that Keynesian economists will react to their loss of supremacy by 
inventing models that will vindicate their ideological standpoint, a prediction that has been 
fulfilled. However, Lucas is wrong when he said that the Keynesians’ strategy of ‘winging it’ 
was a purely sociological occurrence. They may well have acted on ideological grounds, but 
the end result is that new models were created. Hence their attempt was as much theoretical as 
ideological! What is true for Keynesians is of course also true for anti-Keynesians. Friedman 
is a fine example in this respect. His Presidential Address (Friedman 1968), which blazed the 
way for the new classical revolution, is a good example of ‘winging it’! 
Above, I quoted a letter from Lucas to Sims in which he stated that theoretical discussions 
cannot settle ideological disputes. The sequel to that passage is also worth considering: 
It seems that our job is to try to make controversy useful, by focusing on discussable, 
analyzable  issues.  In  Taylor’s  first  paper,  for  example,  contract  length  was  selected 
arbitrarily (hence ‘controversially’) and was central to the operating characteristics of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
steady and entirely understandable erosion in the belief on the part of noneconomists that aggregative economics 
has anything useful to say” (Lucas [1977] 1981a, pp. 216-7, Lucas’s emphasis).   12 
model. But labor contracts are something we can find independent evidence on (as John 
did) or theorize about (as many people are now doing). Work like this is productive not 
because  it  settles  policy  issues  in  a  way  that  honest  people  can’t  disagree  over  but 
because it  channels controversy onto potentially productive tracks, because it gets us 
talking and thinking about issues that our equipment may let us make some progress on. 
(Lucas, various, Box 29, letter to Sims, dated July 15, 1982). 
In  this  passage,  Lucas  seems  to  admit  that  the  position  taken  by  macroeconomists  is 
influenced by their ideological standpoint. This being granted, economists should “channel 
controversy onto productive tracks”. But ‘channeling’ ideology does not mean excluding it, 
while ‘productive tracks’ does mean using mathematical models (i.e. making the conversation 
mathematical). The authors who invented staggering-contracts models wanted to justify the 
efficiency of the monetary-policy claim against Friedman and Lucas, a project that Lucas 
found  legitimate  and  conducive  to  progress.  But  this  opinion  amounted  to  accepting  that 
theory is ideologically driven. In this way, Lucas, to all intents and purposes, moved away 
from the non-interference principle. 
If my interpretation is accepted, what counts for Lucas is that ideology, the presence of which 
cannot be avoided, is at least tamed. For him, this happens when theory takes a mathematical 
form.
15 Not, however, that scientific results will succed in eliminating ideological differences. 
The following two quotations, the first drawn from Lucas’s correspondence, the second from 
the same fragment as above, make the point: 
Really,  there  is  never  going to  be  such  a  thing  as  an  uncontroversial  way  to  settle 
disputes over economic policy, nor do I see why one would hope for such a state of 
affairs. (Lucas, various, Box 29, Correspondence 1982 folder, letter to Sims, dated July 
15, 1982). 
The classical issue of the proper role of government in a democratic society, of ‘laws 
versus men’ or ‘rules versus authority’, are not going to be settled by technical advances 
in economics. It follows that no one’s position on such basic questions needs to be 
threatened by such new technologies as may come to be at our disposal [Lucas has in 
mind here rational expectations] (Lucas, various, Box 23). 
 
                                                 
15  A  by-product  of  this  form  is  that  simplifies  interpretation.  Any  theory  written  in  prose  runs  the  risk  of 
generating endless sterile hermeneutic discussions, as witnessed by the fate of Keynes’s General Theory (1936). 
The use of mathematical models eliminates such ambiguities.   13 
3. Lucas on the ‘non-exploitation’ precept 
The ‘non-interference’ precept, discussed above, is easy to understand. Next, I want to discuss 
a more mysterious principle, namely the idea that the policy conclusions of models should not 
be translated into policy recommendations for governments. 
Lucas  wants  macroeconomic  models  to  result  in  policy  conclusions.  This  will  raise  no 
eyebrows. More intriguing, however, is his cautious attitude to the political exploitation of 
these conclusions. The following passage from the concluding section of his “Understanding 
Business Cycles” article is instructive in this respect: 
By seeking an equilibrium account of business cycles, one accepts in advance rather 
severe limitations on the scope of governmental countercyclical policy which might be 
rationalized by the theory (Lucas [1977] 1981a, p. 234, Lucas’s emphasis). 
The important element of this quote is the term ‘in advance’, italicized by Lucas. By stressing 
this he admits that the limitation on countercyclical policy follows from the premises of his 
model. If this is the case, in all honesty, the model-builder economist has no grounds for 
recommending  the  government  not  to  engage  in  countercyclical  policy.  Thus,  Lucas’s 
position  is  balanced  on  a  razor’s  edge:  models  need  to  reach  policy  conclusions,  but 
economists should refrain from exploiting these conclusions politically.  
Again, while this point is only hinted at in Lucas’s published papers, much more is to be 
found in the archives:  
One now reads of rational expectations not in Econometrica but in Time and Business 
Week, where it appears as a ‘school’ or ‘theory’ with apparently sweeping implications 
for  important  issues  of  economic  policy.  These  implications  seem  primarily  of  a 
“conservative” cast, favoring a reducing role for government, balanced budget fiscal 
policy, and tight and “unaccommodating” monetary policy. Now the idea of limited 
government, budget balance and tight money are not unimportant to me; they are high 
on the list of values I carry into the voting booth every year, and for reasons I am 
willing to defend in some detail. These developments are not, then, one which I find 
unwelcome  or  displeasing,  nor  do  I  find  the  journalistic  treatment  of  rational 
expectations  any  less  accurate  than  similar  treatments  of  other  developments  in 
economics.  Yet  there  is  something  wrong,  and  necessarily  transient,  with  this  easy 
translation of a technical contribution to economic theory into a platform for economic 
policy. … There can be no simple connection between what appears on the scratch pads 
of professional economists, however original, and important conclusions about the way 
our society ought to operate (Lucas, various, Box 23, Barro folder).
16  
                                                 
16 That there no simple connection does not mean that there is no connection. The text continues: “There is also, 
I believe, something very right about these connections, something very permanent. If this belief is correct, then   14 
Interpreted  in  a  minimal  way,  this  passage  states  that  economists  should  be  cautious  in 
extending the policy conclusions of their models into direct advice to governments. Taken 
maximally,  it means  that  economists  should  totally  refrain from  politically  exploiting  the 
results of their models. This is the ‘non-exploitation’ precept: since policy conclusions are 
embedded in the models’ premises, intellectual honesty forbids transforming them into policy 
recommendations.  
What justifies such a precept? There would be no problem if an ideological view and a policy 
conclusion were separate notions. But this is not so. Take Lucas’s “Expectations and the 
Neutrality of Money” article ([1977] 1981a,). It is a confirmation of Friedman’s theoretical 
conclusion  about  the  inefficiency  of  monetary  policy  (Friedman  1968).  An  associated 
conclusion  is  that  central  bankers  should  be  constrained  by  rules  instead  of  enjoying 
discretion.  Look  now  at  the  ideological  sphere.  The  free-market  ideology  states  that  the 
market economy works better without state interference. This general principle can take many 
concrete forms. When it comes to monetary matters, the prevalence of rules over discretion is 
one of these. But since this prevalence is grounded on the inefficiency of monetary policy, the 
latter should also be considered a tenet of the free-market ideology. So, the inefficiency of 
monetary policy is both a theoretical conclusion of the models used by Friedman and Lucas 
and a tenet of the free-market ideology. But then it must be recognized that Lucas’s theory has 
an  ideological  dimension.
17  The  non-exploitation  principle  permits  its  presence  to  be 
neutralized.  
The excerpts from Lucas’s writings I have explored up to now suggest that Lucas abides by 
the ‘non-exploitation’ precept. Such an attitude of ‘methodological purism’ requires a high 
degree of stoicism, since it amounts for the model-builder to foregoing the opportunity to 
promote her preferred ideology. However, as was the case for the ‘non-interference’ principle, 
other passages from Lucas’s work suggest that he did not always fully abide by this precept.  
Although this has only rarely been pointed out (see however, Hahn (1982), Modigliani (1989) 
and De Vroey (2004)), Friedman’s policy conclusion that monetary expansion has no durable 
effect on unemployment is premised on the assumption that the natural rate of unemployment 
has already been attained when this expansion takes place. This is a case where Keynesians 
would admit that there is no rationale for monetary activism. In other words, the inefficiency 
conclusion is as much built into the premises of Friedman’s model as it is in Lucas’s. Hence 
the non-exploitation precept should apply. However, this is not the line taken by Lucas. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
it may be of value to attempt to distinguish exactly what it is that is wrong about currently popular views about 
rational  expectations  and  economic  policy  from  that  which  is  right.  Doing  this  successfully  would  involve 
discussing the relationship between theory and policy in terms which differ rather markedly, but which are not 
really more difficult or technical, from those in current use in policy oriented discussions” (Lucas, various, Box 
23, Barro folder). Unfortunately, these passages come from loose sheets and, while Lucas seems to announce a 
new discussion of the relationship between theory and policy, nothing of the kind is to be found in the archives.  
17 The same is true, of course, for Keynesian or neo-Keynesian theory.    15 
reason  he  took  another  line  is  that  an  additional  element  had  entered  the  picture,  the 
possibility  of  obtaining  an  empirical  validation  of  the  prediction  made  by  a  theory,  a 
possibility that was absent from his own models. Lucas recurrently expressed the view that 
the  stagflation  of  the  1970s  was  a  quasi-laboratory  experiment  allowing  economists  to 
discriminate  between  the  Keynesian  Phillips-curve  and  the  natural-rate-of-unemployment 
models, and the result of which was a hands down victory for Friedman’s theory. Because of 
this  predictive  success,  Lucas’s  qualms  about  the  political  exploitation  of  the  model’s 
conclusion vanish! In spite of their ideological content, theoretical policy conclusions can be 
used in support of policy recommendations on the basis of the predictive success of empirical 
work. In other words, the prediction criterion has overridden the non-exploitation principle.  
 
4. Assessing Lucas’s standpoint 
Lucas on methodology, compared to methodologists on methodology  
My analysis indicates that Lucas has devoted a lot of attention to methodology. However, this 
is methodology as conceived by an economist, not methodologists’ methodology. Treading in 
Friedman’s footsteps when he wrote “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (Friedman 
1953), Lucas is a self-taught methodologist who does not bother to relate his thoughts on 
methodology to the methodological literature. Had he done so, he would have realized that his 
identification of a theory and a model is very much a minority viewpoint. Most methodologist 
take the opposite stance.
18 While assessing the pros and cons of the two standpoints is beyond 
my competence, I would nonetheless criticize Lucas for hammering away at his claim that a 
theory and a model are identical (the result of which is that only mathematical economics is 
admissible  economics)  without  justifying  it  in  a  systematic  way.  He  contents  himself  to 
decalre, firstly, that no cumulative progress can occur without this identity, and, secondly, that 
it  prevents  theory  from  being  contaminated  with  ideology.  Avoiding  these  pitfalls  is  an 
undeniable  advantage  of  the  mathematical  method.  However,  pointing  them  out  may  not 
suffice to seal the matter. 
The narrowness of Lucas’s conception of theory also surfaces when considering where he 
locates the boundary between ideology and theory. In my view, Lucas’s definition of ideology 
is too broad. As we have seen, to him, everything that is not mathematically modeled is 
ideological. I am of the opinion that there are  better ways to make the division between 
ideology  and  theory.  First,  draw  a  distinction  between  ideology,  defined  as  a  normative 
viewpoint about the respective roles of the state and the market in organizing the economy, 
and theory, defined as an articulated conceptual apparatus. Then distinguish two types of 
theory:  those  abiding  by  the  Walras-Lucas  standpoint,  where  a  theory  is  a  mathematical 
                                                 
18 See e.g. Hands (2001), Hausman (1992), Mäki (2002), Morgan and Morrison (1999).    16 
model;  and  those  adhering  to  the  Marshall-Leijonhufvud  view  (and  that  of  most 
methodologists) that a theory and a model operate at two different levels. In this taxonomy, 
Coase’s and Hayek’s work and many other studies, including Keynes’s General Theory, are 
included in the ‘theory’ category. Lucas’s dismissive judgment about such contributions could 
still be held but would then just relate to their being an unproductive way of doing theory.  
The analogy idea is another of Lucas’s idiosyncrasies. As far as I am aware, this idea is absent 
from methodological writings. Not surprisingly, the only place I encountered a similar view 
was in an article written by another economic theorist venturing into the field of methodology, 
Robert Sugden. In his, “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economic” 
(Sugden  2002),  Sugden  reflects  on  model-building  in  economics  by  examining  the 
methodological status of two well-know papers, Akerlof’s market-for-lemons article (Akerlof  
1970)  and  Schellings’s  “Sorting  and  Mixing:  Race  and  Sex”  paper  introducing  the 
checkerboard  city  model  (Schelling  1978).  Comparing  these  models  to  prevailing 
methodological conceptions, Sugden concludes that none of the prevailing approaches can 
completely account for the distinct contributions of these two papers. He ends up proposing 
his own take on the subject. Here is how he summarizes it: 
We gain confidence in such inductive inferences, I suggest, by being able to see the 
relevant models as instances of some category, some of whose instances actually exist 
in  the  real  world.  Thus,  we  see  Schelling’s  checkerboard  cities  as  possible  cities, 
alongside real cities like New York and Philadelphia. We see Akerlof’s used-car market 
as a possible market, alongside real markets such as the real market for used cars in a 
particular city, or the market for a particular type of insurance. … On this view, the 
model is not so much an abstraction from reality as a parallel reality. The model world 
is not constructed by starting with the real world and stripping out complicating factors: 
although the model is simpler than the real world, the one is not a simplification of the 
other. The model is realistic in the same sense that a novel can be called realistic. In a 
realistic  novel,  the  characters  and  locations  are  imaginary,  but  the  author  has  to 
convince us that they are credible — that there could be people and places like those in 
the novel” (Sugden 2002, p. 131; his emphasis). 
Sugden’s view of models as credible worlds comes close to Lucas’s definition of models as 
pertaining to analogous economies. However, as will be seen below, there is an important 
difference between the two views. In effect, unlike Lucas, ‘credible world’ economists stop 
short of engaging in empirical work.  
A political agenda? 
Once it is recognized that Lucas is aware of the ideological underpinning of theoretical work, 
can the further step be made of declaring that  — horror of horrors — the new classical 
revolution resulted from a political agenda? Or, to put it the other way round, is it conceivable   17 
that the transformation from a paradigm supporting a given ideology to one supporting the 
rival ideology could arise without a political agenda or ideological motivation? Beyond doubt, 
Luca’s answer to this last question will be ‘yes’, and he would cite his own work as a case in 
point. This he made clear in his “My Keynesian Education” (Lucas 2004) lecture. In this 
piece, he developed the view that there was a time when he considered himself a Keynesian 
— not a fundamentalist Keynesian, taking the General Theory as a holy text, but somebody 
ready  to  work  on  developing  Keynesian  empirical  models.  But,  the  story  goes  on,  in 
experimenting with these models, he stumbled over methodological problems which, upon 
further scrutiny, proved to be insuperable. So,  when Lucas became a  strong opponent of 
Keynesian theory, he claimed it was on purely scientific grounds.
19  
However, this might not be the full story. We do not know when Lucas became a defender of 
free-market ideology, but we do know from his “Professional Memoir” (Lucas 2001) that this 
approach was not one that he imbibed with his mother’s milk. So, at some time, he must have 
changed his mind. It can be presumed that this happened during his graduate education in 
Chicago. If he started to work within the Keynesian paradigm after becoming a conservative, 
there  must  have  been,  at  this  time,  a  tension  between  his  own  ideology  and  the  policy 
conclusion towards which the approach he was working in was geared.  
At this juncture, two events occurred more or less concomitantly: Lucas’s discovery of the 
methodological  flaws  in  Keynesian  theory,  and  Friedman’s  introduction  of  the  idea  of  a 
natural rate of unemployment. For my part, I believe that Lucas’s criticisms of Keynesian 
theory were basically correct. But had he been Keynesian in an ideological sense, he might 
have decided to work on reconstructing Keynesian theory so as to preserve the congruency 
between his ideology and the theory — to become a non-Walrasian macroeconomist à la 
Barro-Grossman,  Drèze,  or  Benassy,  to  create  new  Keynesian  models  (e.g.  staggering 
contracts models) or to take a line similar to Gordon’s. But, as I have already suggested, 
Lucas was experiencing a lack of congruency between his ideology and Keynesian theory. 
Friedman’s theory offered him the possibility of changing this state of affairs. Two models 
stood side by side, the Keynesian Phillips curve and the natural rate of unemployment models, 
underpinned by opposing ideological visions. By writing his “Expectations and the Neutrality 
                                                 
19 The following observations that Sargent made in interviews can, I think, be safely extended to Lucas: “But 
isn’t it the case that what you define as a problem depends on what your starting position is? Absolutely. That’s 
exactly why rational expectations stuff was developed by people within the Keynesian tradition. There were 
people  trying  to  knock  off  and  destroy  the  Keynesian  tradition  from  the  outside,  who  weren’t  sympathetic 
enough to it to learn it. And I mean it was the monetarist tradition or something like that. And the paradox is that, 
I would say what’s ended up being perceived as the most destructive in Keynesian tradition is from its own 
children. You know? Because, if you look at what, say Lucas, Prescott, Wallace, and Barro were working on, 
those were all pieces of a Keynesian model, a high-tech Keynesian style” (Sargent interviewed by Sent (1998, 
pp. 165-66). “[Klamer]: Are the political aspects an important question? [Sargent]: I am not really interested in 
politics. The rational expectations stuff is clearly not politically motivated. People from all sorts of different 
political  perspectives  contribute  to  it.  It’s  more  a  technical  revolution  .…  No,  it’s  certainly  not  politically 
motivated” (Sargent interviewed by Klamer 1984, p. 80).   18 
of Money” article, Lucas chose Friedman’s camp. Here, the historian of economic theory 
faces  a  signal  extraction  problem:  there  is  one  observation,  the  move  towards  a  model 
supporting conservative policy conclusions, and two possible causes, ideology and theory. It 
may be surmised that both have played a part. If this surmise is accepted, we must conclude 
that the ideological dimension played a role in Lucas’s work, and there is no shame in this. 
 Moreover, even if it is accepted that Lucas’s transformation of macroeconomics comprises an 
ideological dimension, it would still be an exaggeration to say that it followed from a political 
agenda. Actually, Lucas, Sargent and their associates did not need to act upon a political 
agenda  because  that  the  job  of  gearing  theory  towards  a  political  agenda  other  than  the 
Keynesian  one  had  already  been  carried  out  by  Milton  Friedman.  Hence  they  could 
concentrate on working, as pure technicians, on the conceptual and technical modifications 
that would provide firmer ground for Friedman’s policy conclusions. In other words, it seems 
that a division of labor occurred implicitly, with Friedman doing the political job, and the next 
generation undertaking the theoretical developments needed to underpin the political agenda 
initiated by Friedman.
20  
The consistency of Lucas’s conception of theory 
I have already pointed out that Lucas wavers between two positions on the relation between 
ideology and theory, as well as on the political use of conclusions drawn from the models. I 
now want to link his hesitations to his conception of a theory. Is this conception consistent? I 
have my doubts. At issue is whether the following set of propositions: (a) theory and model 
are the same thing; (b) theoretical propositions pertain to the model economy rather than to 
reality; (c) models should be assessed in terms of their usefulness rather than their truth value; 
(d) macroeconomics has a utopian dimension; is compatible with the proposition (e) that the 
validity of a model is to be ascertained on the ground of its predictive ability.  
The rationale for raising this question lies in my past work on the history of neoclassical 
theory, which led me to claim that the Walrasian and the Marshallian approaches should be 
viewed  as  two  alternative  rather  than  complementary  research  programs.
21  Lausanne  and 
Chicago  are  two  different  universes.  Authors  such  as  Arrow,  Debreu,  and  Hahn,  of  the 
Lausanne  School,  have  repeatedly  hammered  home  the  point  that  Walrasian  general 
                                                 
20 An additional caveat is that a scientific revolution is not a necessary condition for triggering a radical turn in 
policy conclusions. To wit, Friedman’s expectations-augmented Phillips curve model was hardly a full break 
away from standard Keynesian macroeconomics. The same is true for New Keynesian Phillips curve models 
with respect to the DSGE approach. 
21 For a succinct account of this research, see De Vroey (2009a, 2009b). It can be inferred from what Lucas said 
in interviews that he might concur with my claim: “Question [to Lucas]: You acknowledge that Friedman has 
had a great influence on you, yet his methodological approach is completely different to your own approach to 
macroeconomics. Why did his methodological approach not appeal to you? Answer: I like mathematics and 
general equilibrium theory. Friedman didn’t. ... Question: His methodological approach seems more in keeping 
with Keynes and Marshall. Answer: He describes himself as Marshallian, although I don’t know quite what it 
means. Whatever it is, it’s not what I think of myself” (Lucas’s interview by Snowdon and Vane 1998, p.132).   19 
equilibrium theory is an abstract construction, the strength of which lies in its ability to posit 
issues in a rigorous way. Its main interest with respect to reality, they argue, is to provide a 
negative  benchmark.  The  Chicago  approach  is  totally  different.  According  to  Friedman, 
whom I take as the emblematic Marshallian economist, the aim of economic theory is to 
answer specific questions, not at the level of principles but in order to reveal concrete truths. 
The theorist ought to elicit propositions about reality that have a predictive value, and the 
decision  about  the  merits  of  rival  theories  should  be  based  on  a  comparison  of  their 
predictions.  
I am of the opinion the two schools have each numerous merits, but they should not be mixed. 
My criticism of Lucas’s methodological vision is then that he has one foot in Lausanne and 
the other in Chicago. Symptomatic of this ambiguity is the fact that, while he himself claims a 
Walrasian  affiliation  —  “I  am  a  hopeless  ‘neo-Walrasian’  ”  (Lucas,  various,  Box  30, 
Correspondence 1977-79 folder, in a letter to Driscoll, dated November 23, 1977) — most 
neo-Walrasians are reluctant to acknowledge him as one of them.  
Bob  [Lucas]  was  in  the  Chicago  tradition  and  was  very  concerned  about  empirical 
testing — whatever the hell that means— something that I have little sympathy for and 
very  little  interest  in,  to  be  perfectly  honest.  So  there  was  quite  a  difference  in 
viewpoints  about  why  you  did  theory  and  what  the  relevance  of  theory  is  (Cass’s 
interview with Spear and Wright 1988, p. 546). 
To  further  develop  my  point,  I  will  proceed  step  by  step.  Let  me  first  consider  Lucas’s 
conception of theory under the assumption that it comprises only propositions (a) to (d). This 
amounts to just considering Lucas’s “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” and “An 
Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle” papers and forgetting about his endorsement of 
real business cycle models. I pose two questions: first, which affiliation would best fit this 
redefinition of Lucas’s conception of theory, the Walrasian or the Marshallian? Second, can it 
be considered consistent?  
My  answer  to  the  first  question  is  that  Lucas’s  approach,  as  redefined  above,  is  purely 
Walrasian. Neo-Walrasian economists could easily hail these papers as excellent contributions 
to their field. Marshallians, such as Friedman, would agree with this diagnosis, and for this 
reason  they  would  reject  it.
22  As  to  the  second  question,  my  answer  is  ‘Yes’  with  two 
qualifications. The first is that, in this case, where the predictive test is excluded by definition, 
Lucas should refrain from claiming that Friedman’s expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
model is superior to the Keynesian trade-off model because the result of Friedman’s model is 
built in its assumptions. The second qualification concerns Lucas’s argument about model 
economies playing an analogous role. Lucas states that the right question to ask about a given 
model economy is whether it is useful, not whether it is true. Of course, neo-Walrasians 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of Friedman’s attitude towards general equilibrium analysis, see De Vroey (2009b).   20 
would agree with him, for it would be surprising if any economists declared that their theory 
was totally useless. But this being said, they are rather vague when it comes to describing 
what their theory’s usefulness consists of.
23 By contrast, Lucas gives the usefulness term a 
more precise content by declaring that it bears on the ability of analogous models to assess 
alternative  economic  policy  measures.  This  assessment  requires  economists  to  engage  in 
empirical work. If Lucas’s conception of theory excluded empirical testing, he would have to 
fall back on the negative benchmark argument of traditional neo-Walrasians instead of his 
more precise concept of usefulness.  
Let  me  now  drop  the  fable  of  a  Lucasian  conception  of  theory  without  the  empirical 
comparison feature, and return to his full-fledged conception. The same two questions can be 
asked. As to the first one (Marshall or Walras?), it can no longer be concluded that this 
conception is purely Walrasian. Standard neo-Walrasians would be reluctant to embrace it 
because it fails, they would argue, to recognize the limits of the Walrasian (or neo-Walrasian) 
research program. 
The [Walrasian] ‘equilibrium’ story is one in which empirical work, ideas of fact and 
falsifications, played no role at all (Weintraub 1983, p. 37).  
It is for all these reasons that I have always held the view that the Walrasian theory in 
all of its manifestations is an important theoretical benchmark but that a vast and unruly 
terrain had to be traversed before one understood (let alone predicted) the behavior of an 
actual  economy.  No  economist  and  certainly  no  theorist  should  be  ignorant  of  the 
Walrasian  theory,  and  no  economist  and  certainly  no  theorist  should  pronounce  on 
actual economies and policies on its basis alone (Hahn 1983, p. 224).
24 
By  contrast,  Marshallians  would  full-heartedly  endorse  Lucas’s  last  proposition  (that  the 
validity of a model is to be ascertained on the ground of its predictive ability). They would 
thereby rejoice that Lucas remains a Chicago economist, despite what they would see as his 
flirtation with the Lausanne School on other scores. 
But what about consistency? The optimistic interpretation of stating that scientific progress 
has occurred is conceivable: Lucas (and, even more, Kydland and Prescott) took what was 
good in Lausanne and in Chicago, thereby allowing the development of what could be called 
                                                 
23 For example, in the sequel to the passage of Cass’s interview quoted above, Cass says that “I am still of the 
opinion that theory is more a way of organizing your thoughts, how you would think about the world. And it’s 
strongest in providing counterexamples when people confidently clam that something is true in general” (Cass 
1988, p. 546). In the same vein, Hahn writes that “The importance of this intellectual achievement [The Arrow-
Debreu model] is that it provides a benchmark. By this I mean that it serves a function similar to that which a 
perfectly healthy body might serve a clinical diagnostician when he looks at an actual body” (Hahn [1982] 1984, 
p. 308). 
24 Walras himself could be invoked. On page 17 of his copy of Cournot’s Principes de la théorie de la richesse, 
held at the Centre Walras-Pareto of the University of Lausanne, he made the following annotation: “la théorie 
pure n’attend aucune confirmation de la réalité” [pure theory requires no confirmation from reality] (Baranzini 
and Bridel 2005, p. 360, note 3).   21 
the Lausanne-Chicago synthesis. This is the gist of Woodford’s (1999) appraisal in Part I of 
this paper, where he evokes the transformation from the Lucasian parable to the Kydland and 
Prescott ‘literal description of the economy’.  
Considering that the two models involved are very similar, one may wonder by what miracle 
such  a  transmutation  of  epistemological  status  occurred.  The  answer  is  calibration,  a 
technique that, it must be admitted, has  some  Walrasian credentials, since it started with 
computational general equilibrium analysis. Thus, the judgment to be made about whether 
scientific progress occurred hinges on the validity of the model and of the computational 
technique. If a static viewpoint is adopted, the matter is easily decided: on the one hand, it 
seems ridiculous to claim that the Kydland and Prescott model is even a crude caricature of 
reality; on the other hand, the calibration method, which as Hansen and Heckman (1996) 
argued had serious defects in the computational general equilibrium approach, is all the more 
flawed when it comes to Kydland and Prescott’s use of it. However, if a dynamic viewpoint is 
adopted (i.e. looking at work stemming from this model), a different picture emerges. With 
hindsight, the Kydland and Prescott model has proven to be the base camp of impressive 
developments  while  the  initial  calibration  method  has  gradually  been  reconciled  with 
econometrics.
25 So, if asked whether the new approach flew, the answer is that it did. But if 
the question is whether any methodological justification of such a bold and in the end fruitful 
approach has been provided, my answer is ‘No’. The answer is the same if the question is 
whether Lucas’s conception of theory provides such a justification. The reason is that this 
conception  rests  on  an  unexplained  amalgam  of  Walrasian  and  Marshallian-Friedmanian 
methodological principles.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  assess  Lucas’s  methodological  ideas,  in  particular  the 
relationship he saw between ideology and theory, and not his contribution to the development 
of macroeconomics. Three conclusions can be drawn. First, Lucas must be praised for having 
engaged in detailed reflection on methodological issues. Few, if any, contemporary theorists 
have  dealt  with  methodology  in  such  a  subtle  and  original  way  as  he  did.  My  second 
conclusion is that the consistency of Lucas’s overall conception can be questioned. I view him 
as walking on a tightrope. I have shown that, while there are good grounds for concluding that 
Lucas adheres to the ‘non-interference’ and the ‘non-exploitation’ precepts, other passages in 
his  writing  tilt  towards  the  opposite  viewpoint.  But  the  main  ambiguity  lies  in  his 
                                                 
25 As stated by Rogoff, “It has been said that a brilliant theory is one which at first seems ridiculous and later 
seems obvious. There are many that feel that [real business cycle] research has passed the first test. But they 
should recognize the definite possibility that it may someday pass the second test as well” (Rogoff 1986, p. 46).   22 
endorsement of Kydland and Prescott’s grafting of a Friedmanian empirical perspective onto 
a neo-Walrasian model.  
The lesson I draw from this is that, somewhat oddly, being consistent in the meta-theoretical 
field can be more difficult than being consistent in the theoretical field. The existence of these 
tensions may also explain why Lucas never wrote a synthesis of his methodological ideas, 
contenting himself with acting as a Zen master providing profound, if elliptic, remarks but 
failing to provide any clues about how the pieces of the jigsaw fit together. Granted the 
presence of these tensions, it is nonetheless obvious — and this is my last conclusion — that 
Lucas’s methodological conception comprises a core principle, namely that macroeconomics 
ought to consist exclusively of mathematical models, which must be solidly microfounded. 
He has defended this idea adamantly from day one onwards: it is clearly his deep-rooted 
conviction that this is the only way to make progress. 
 
References 
Akerlof,  G.  (1970),  “The  Market  for  ‘Lemmons’:  Quality  Uncertainty  and  the  Market 
Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84, pp. 488-500. 
Baranzini, R. and P. Bridel (2005), “L’Ecole de Lausanne, l’utilité marginale moyenne et 
l’idée de marché” in Bensimon, G. (ed.), Histoire des représentations du marché, Paris: 
Houdiard, 2005, pp. 347-65.  
Cass, D. (1998), “Interview with David Cass by S. Spear and R. Wright”, Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, vol. 2, pp. 533-558. 
De  Vroey,  M.  (2010)  “Lucas  on  the  Lucasian  Transformation  of  Macroeconomics:  An 
Assessment », mimeo.  
De  Vroey,  M.  (2009a),  “Marshall  and  Walras:  Incompatible  Bedfellows?”,  University  of 
Louvain, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper, No. 200908. 
De  Vroey,  M.  (2009b),  “On  the  Right  Side  for  the  Wrong  Reason:  Friedman  on  the 
Marshall−Walras divide” in U. Maki (ed.), The Methodology of Positive Economics. 
Milton Friedman’s Essay Fifty Years Later. Cambridge University Press, pp. 321-346. 
De Vroey, M. (2004), Involuntary Unemployment: The Elusive Quest for a Theory, London: 
Routledge. 
Friedman, M. (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review, vol. 58, 
pp. 1-17. 
Friedman, M. (1953), “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, in Friedman, Essays in 
Positive Economics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-43. 
Hahn,  F.  ([1982]  1984),  “Why  I  am  not  a  monetarist”,  in  Hahn,  Equilibrium  and 
Macroeconomics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 307-326. 
Hahn,  F.  (1983),  “Comment  on  Axel  Leijonhufvud’s  ‘Keynesianism,  Monetarism  and 
Rational  Expectations:  Some  Reflections  and  Conjectures”,  in  Frydman  R.  and  E. 
Phelps (eds.), Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: Rational Expectations 
Explained, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 223-230.    
Hahn, F. (1982), Money and Inflation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hands, D. W. (2001), Reflections Without Rules. Economic Methodology and Contemporary 
Science Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   23 
Hansen, L. and J. Heckman (1996), “The Empirical Foundations of Calibration”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 10, pp. 87-104. 
Hausman, D. (1992), The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mäki, U. (2002), Fact and Fiction in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keynes J.  M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: 
Macmillan. 
Klamer, A. (1984), Conversations with Economists, Totowa: Rowman and Allenheld. 
Kydland,  F.  and  E.  Prescott  (1982),  “Time  to  Build  and  Aggregate  Fluctuations”, 
Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 1345-70. 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1997), “Models and Theories”, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 4, 
pp. 193-8.  
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (2007), “Remarks on the Influence of Edward Prescott”, Economic Theory, 
vol. 32, pp. 7-11. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (2004), “My Keynesian Education”, in De Vroey, M. and K. Hoover (eds.), 
The IS-LM Model: Its Rise, Fall and Strange Persistence, Duke University Press, pp. 
12-24. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr., (2001), Professional Memoir, mimeo, (http://home.uchicago.edu/~sogrodow/ 
homepage/papers.html).  
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1987), Models of Business Cycles, Basil Blackwell: Oxford. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1986), “Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory”, Journal of Business, vol. 
59, pp. S 401- S426. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1981a), Studies in Business Cycle Theory, Cambridge (Mass.): The M.I.T. 
Press. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1981b), “Tobin and Monetarism: A Review Article”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. XIX, pp. 558-567. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. ([1980a] 1981a), “Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory”, in 
Studies in Business Cycle Theory, pp. 271-296. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. ([1980b] 1981a), “Rule, Discretion and the Role of Economic Adviser”, in 
Studies in Business Cycle Theory, pp. 248-261. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. ([1977] 1981a), “Understanding Business Cycles” in Studies in Business 
Cycle Theory, pp. 215-239. 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (various), Lucas Archives, Duke’s University Special Archives division.  
Lucas R. E. Jr. and L. A. Rapping ([1969] 1981a), “Real Wages, Employment, and Inflation”, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 77, pp. 721-754. 
Mâki, U. (ed.), Facts and Fictions in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Medema,  S.  (2010),  “The  Coase  Theorem  in  the  Textbooks,  1960-1979:  The  Case  of 
Intermediate Microeconomics.” Working Paper, University of Colorado Denver, April 
2010. 
Modigliani, F. (1989), “Testimony II: An Interview. Franco Modigliani” in G. R. Feiwell 
(ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and 
Beyond, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 569-581.  
Morgan, M. and M. Morrison (1999) (eds.), Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural 
and Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Region  The  (1993),  “Interview  with  Robert  E.  Jr.  Lucas”,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Minneapolis, June.  
Rogoff, K. (1986), “Theory Ahead of Business-Cycle Measurement: A Comment” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series in Public Policy, vol. 25, pp. 45-48. 
Schelling,  T.  (1978),  “Sorting  and  Mixing;  Race  and  Sex”  in  Micromotives  and 
Macrobehaviour, New-York: Norton.    24 
Sent,  E-M.  (1998),  The  Evolving  Rationality  of  Rational  Expectations:  An  Assessment  of 
Thomas Sargent’s Achievements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Snowdon, B. and H. Vane (2005), Modern Macroeconomics: Its Origins, Development and 
Current State, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Snowdon, B. and H. Vane (1998), “Transforming Macroeconomics: An Interview with Robert 
E Lucas Jr.”, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 5, pp. 115-145. 
Sugden, R. (2002), “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economic”  in 
Mâki (ed.), Facts and Fictions in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 107-36. 
Tobin, J. (1982), Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Vercelli, A. (1991), Methodological Foundations of Macroeconomics:  Keynes and Lucas, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Walras,  L.  (2000),  Oeuvres  diverses,  Auguste  et  Léon  Walras,  Oeuvres  économiques 
complètes, vol. XIII, P. Dockès, C. Mouchot et J.-P. Potier (eds.) Paris: Economica.  
Weintraub, E. R. (1983), “The Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium: 1930-1954”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol. XXI, pp. 1-39. 
Woodford, M. (1999), “Revolution and Evolution in Twentieth-Century Macroeconomics”, 
Presented at the conference, Frontiers of the Mind in the Twenty-First Century, U.S. 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., http://www.columbia.edu/~mw2230/ ISSN 1379-244X D/2010/3082/031